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Moral judgment as information
processing: an integrative review
Steve Guglielmo*
Department of Psychology, Macalester College, Saint Paul, MN, USA
How do humans make moral judgments about others’ behavior? This article reviews
dominant models of moral judgment, organizing them within an overarching framework
of information processing. This framework poses two distinct questions: (1) What input
information guides moral judgments? and (2) What psychological processes generate
these judgments? Information Models address the first question, identifying critical
information elements (including causality, intentionality, and mental states) that shape
moral judgments. A subclass of Biased Information Models holds that perceptions
of these information elements are themselves driven by prior moral judgments.
Processing Models address the second question, and existing models have focused
on the relative contribution of intuitive versus deliberative processes. This review
organizes existing moral judgment models within this framework and critically evaluates
them on empirical and theoretical grounds; it then outlines a general integrative
model grounded in information processing, and concludes with conceptual and
methodological suggestions for future research. The information-processing framework
provides a useful theoretical lens through which to organize extant and future work in
the rapidly growing field of moral judgment.
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Judging the morality of behavior is critical for a well-functioning social group. To ensure fair
and eﬀective interactions among its members, and to ultimately promote cooperation, groups
and individuals must be able to identify instances of wrongdoing and ﬂag them for subsequent
correction and punishment (Boyd and Richerson, 1992; Fehr and Gächter, 2002; DeScioli and
Kurzban, 2009; Tooby and Cosmides, 2010; Chudek and Henrich, 2011). Humans are quite adept
at levying moral judgments and punishment upon others (Henrich et al., 2006; Boyd et al., 2010).
One need only read the news on a given day to discover accusations, and appeals for punishment,
of moral misconduct.
The study of morality has a rich history. Early and inﬂuential philosophers (Aristotle, 1999/330
BC) and psychologists (James, 1890/1950; Freud, 1923/1960) aimed to understand humanmorality
and its implications for social behavior. More recent investigations have widened this scope of
inquiry to examine a host of important questions concerning the evolutionary origins of morality
(Hauser, 2006; Krebs, 2008), the emotional underpinnings of moral development and moral
behavior (Eisenberg, 2000), the infusion of morality into everyday social interactions (Skitka
et al., 2005; Wright et al., 2008), and the instantiation of moral judgment in systems of artiﬁcial
intelligence (Wallach, 2010; Malle, 2014).
But an understanding of these questions requires an understanding of moral judgments
themselves. Perhaps the most fundamental way in which humans categorize and understand
behavior is to diﬀerentiate between good and bad (Osgood et al., 1957; Barrett, 2006b); moral
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judgment is an extension of this basic classiﬁcation, although
it is clearly more varied and complex. The literature has,
for example, explored numerous related yet distinct moral
judgments, including responsibility (Schlenker et al., 1994;
Weiner, 1995), blame (Shaver, 1985; Alicke, 2000; Cushman,
2008; Guglielmo et al., 2009), and wrongness or permissibility
(Haidt, 2001; Greene, 2007; Mikhail, 2007; Knobe, 2010).
How do humans make moral judgments? All judgments
involve information processing, and although the framework
of information processing has been widely implemented in
models of cognitive psychology (Rosch, 1978; Marr, 1982), it
has not been explicitly considered in investigations of morality.
Nonetheless, existing models of moral judgment endorse such a
framework, even if implicitly. With respect to moral judgment,
this framework poses two fundamental questions: (1) What is the
input information that guides people’s moral judgments? and (2)
How can we characterize the psychological processes that generate
moral judgments? Extant models of moral judgment typically
examine just one of these questions, with the unfortunate result
that we know little about how the questions interrelate. This
article critically reviews dominant models by locating them
within this guiding theoretical framework, then provides an
integrative account of moral judgment and oﬀers suggestions for
future research.
OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT REVIEW
The study of moral judgment has grown rapidly, particularly
within the past decade, yielding numerous proposed models
of moral judgment. But although existing models have areas
of substantial overlap, they are often studied in isolation,
and empirical support for a particular aspect of a model
is often taken as evidence for the veracity of the model
as a whole. Further, these models investigate a suite of
diﬀerent moral judgments—including responsibility, blame, and
wrongness, among others—that share commonalities but are not
identical. A comprehensive and systematic analysis of moral
judgment that assesses existing models in their entirety and
in relationship to other models is sorely needed. Such an
analysis would enable clariﬁcation of the claims of and support
for existing models, explication of their areas of agreement
and divergence, and organization within a unifying theoretical
framework. This article provides such an analysis, critically
evaluating existing models on empirical and theoretical grounds
while also locating them within an overarching framework
that emphasizes the information processing nature of moral
judgment.
Existing models of moral judgment can be organized around
their two fundamental goals. The ﬁrst goal is to account for
the particular information content that underlies people’s moral
judgments: the aspects of a behavior, or the agent who performed
it, that lead people to hold the agent responsible, blameworthy,
and so on. Models that focus on this goal are here referred to as
information models (Shaver, 1985; Schlenker et al., 1994; Weiner,
1995; Cushman, 2008). These models include a subclass of biased
information models (Alicke, 2000; Knobe, 2010), which hold that
the very perceptions of such information content are driven
by prior moral judgments. The second goal is to identify the
psychological processes that generatemoral judgments, including
the extent to which these judgments are driven by intuitive
or emotional processes on the one hand, or by deliberative
processes on the other. Models that focus on this goal are
here referred to as processing models (Haidt, 2001; Greene,
2007).
The goals of information models and processing models can
be regarded as largely independent of one another. Revealing the
importance of particular information features does not thereby
establish the relative importance of intuitive or deliberative
processes; similarly, revealing the importance of these processes
does not thereby establish which information content drives
moral judgments (cf. Rosch, 1978). A metaphor helps illustrate
the distinction: we can separately examine the directions of travel
on the one hand (information models) and the modes of travel on
the other (processing models), although we will clearly be most
successful by examining them together.
In reviewing the most prominent models within each of these
classes, this article has three general aims: specifying the claims of
each model; clarifying how the models compare to one another;
and evaluating each model on empirical and theoretical grounds.
The article then outlines a general information-processing view
of moral judgment and highlights a speciﬁc recent model that
adopts an information-processing approach (Malle et al., 2012,
2014). Finally, the paper oﬀers conceptual and methodological
suggestions for future research.
Before proceeding, though, wemust ﬁrst establish the domains
in which moral judgment is relevant. Which general kinds of
behavior have the capacity to elicit moral judgments? Harm and
fairness are paradigmatic domains of moral judgment (Kohlberg,
1969; Turiel, 1983), but recent work has demonstrated the
additional importance of loyalty, authority, and purity domains
(Haidt, 2007, 2008; Graham et al., 2009, 2011; Haidt and
Graham, 2009). Some scholars have argued, in contrast, that harm
represents the single superordinate moral domain (Gray et al.,
2012), and others suggest that moral judgments fundamentally
reﬂect concerns about maintaining social relationships (Rai
and Fiske, 2011). Despite the promise of a multitude of
perspectives, extant research on moral judgment has been
dominated by investigations of harm and fairness, which will
therefore, by necessity, be the primary focus of the current
analysis.
INFORMATION MODELS
Information models specify the features of an agent’s behavior
that shape people’s moral judgments. Early models emphasized
the concept of responsibility (Shaver, 1985; Schlenker et al., 1994;
Weiner, 1995) and although they have provided noteworthy
contributions, the concept of responsibility has proven to
be incomplete in capturing the sensitivity of people’s moral
judgments, as we will see. More recent models, reviewed
subsequently, have examined less ambiguous types of moral
judgments such as wrongness or blame (Cushman, 2008).
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 October 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1637
Guglielmo Moral judgment as information processing
Models of Responsibility
Shaver: Responsibility and Blame
Building upon the seminal work of Heider (1958), Shaver
(1985) oﬀers one of the earliest comprehensive psychological
accounts of the particular components that underlie moral
judgment. Shaver diﬀerentiates between responsibility and blame
judgments, asserting that the latter presuppose the former.
The heart of the model concerns responsibility judgments,
which Shaver (1985, 1996; Shaver and Drown, 1986) argues
are guided by ﬁve elements: the agent’s causal contribution;
awareness of negative consequences; intent to cause the
event; degree of volition (e.g., freedom from coercion); and
appreciation of the action’s wrongness. Indeed, moral evaluations
are sensitive to an agent’s causal and intentional involvement
in a negative action (Darley and Shultz, 1990; Ohtsubo,
2007; Lagnado and Channon, 2008), diﬀerentiate between
responsibility and blame (Harvey and Rule, 1978), and follow a
causality → responsibility → punishment pattern in particular
(Shultz et al., 1981).
However, some aspects of the model are puzzling. Shaver
(1996, p. 246) suggests that in some cases full responsibility
applies yet blame is nulliﬁed—namely, when an agent has
acceptable justiﬁcations, which “claim a larger positive social goal
for which the intentional harm was produced,” or excuses, which
“claim that the particular consequences were not intended.” But
justiﬁcations seemingly appeal to Shaver’s wrongness element of
responsibility, and excuses seemingly appeal to the intentionality
element. Thus, justiﬁcations and excuses should also weaken
responsibility, not just blame. Further, Shaver claims that blame
is assigned “after the perceiver assesses and does not accept”
the oﬀender’s justiﬁcations and excuses (Shaver and Drown,
1986, p. 701, emphasis added). Although justiﬁcations and
excuses can moderate blame substantially—socially desirable
reasons or motives mitigate blame (Lewis et al., 2012; Piazza
et al., 2013), whereas socially undesirable reasons or motives
exacerbate blame (Reeder et al., 2002; Woolfolk et al., 2006)—
there is no evidence that perceivers necessarily consider these
factors prior to assessing blame. The emphasis on withholding
blame until evaluating justiﬁcations and excuses may be
ideal for a prescriptive model of how people should assign
responsibility and blame but not for a descriptive model of
how people actually make these judgments. As it turns out,
Shaver’s (1985) model is intended to be prescriptive; thus, its
explanatory aim diﬀers notably from descriptive models of
moral judgment, on which the remainder of this paper will
focus.
Weiner: Responsibility and Social Conduct
Weiner (1995) examines two related phenomena: people’s
judgments of responsibility and their emotional and behavioral
reactions to others’ behavior. In this model, considerations of
controllability drive people’s responsibility judgments, which in
turn guide their emotional responses (e.g., anger vs. sympathy)
and social actions (e.g., retaliation vs. helping) toward others.
Weiner, like Shaver, holds that causality is a necessary but
not a suﬃcient condition of responsibility: “the cause must be
controllable if the person is to be held responsible” (Weiner, 1995,
p. 11). If the cause of a negative outcome is “uncontrollable”—
such as a heart attack or a low mental aptitude—responsibility
judgments are withheld. Weiner (1995) reviewed a wealth of
evidence showing that perceptions of controllability inﬂuence
people’s judgments of responsibility.
Although Weiner (1995) identiﬁes several critical inputs to
moral judgment, the model omits one key factor: intentionality.
The distinction between intentional and unintentional actions is
critical for moral judgment (Darley and Shultz, 1990; Ohtsubo,
2007; Gray and Wegner, 2008; Lagnado and Channon, 2008),
but the concept of controllability is too broad to capture this
distinction. On Weiner’s (1995) model, both intentional and
unintentional behaviors will often be “controllable,” because the
agent could have acted diﬀerently. But people’s moral judgments
distinguish between intentional behavior and negligent behavior,
even if the negative consequences are identical (Cushman, 2008),
which is reﬂected in the legal distinction between (intentional)
murder and (unintentional) manslaughter. While Weiner’s
model cannot readily distinguish between intentional and
unintentional behavior generally, the notion of controllability
(i.e., consideration of the agent’s capacity to foresee and prevent
the negative outcome) nonetheless succeeds in explaining moral
judgments about unintentional behavior speciﬁcally.
Schlenker et al.: Triangle Model of Responsibility
Schlenker et al. (1994) propose that responsibility judgments
are shaped by the links between a prescription, an event, and
an agent’s identity. In particular, “people are held responsible
to the extent that a clear, well-deﬁned set of prescriptions is
applicable to the event (prescription-event link), the actor is
perceived to be bound by the prescriptions by virtue of his or
her identity (prescription-identity link), and the actor seems to
have (or to have had) personal control over the event, such
as by intentionally producing the consequences (identity-event
link)” (p. 649). The ﬁrst link resembles Shaver’s wrongness
element and the third resemblesWeiner’s controllability element;
the second link (prescription-identity) identiﬁes the importance
of an agent’s obligations in the given situation. Schlenker
et al. (1994) provided evidence that each link independently
contributed to people’s judgments of how responsible a worker
was for his or her job performance. However, Schlenker et al.’s
(1994) model has the same critical weakness as Weiner’s: it omits
intentionality.1 As discussed above, the concept of controllability
is too coarse to capture the distinction between intentional
and unintentional behavior; although both types of behaviors
typically are “controllable,” people’s moral judgments diﬀerentiate
markedly between them.
Limitations of Responsibility Models
Extant models of responsibility highlight several components
that shape people’s moral judgments, including causality,
controllability, and obligation. But these models fall short
as comprehensive accounts of moral judgments due to their
prescriptive emphasis (Shaver, 1985) or their omission of
intentionality (Schlenker et al., 1994; Weiner, 1995). A further
1According to Schlenker et al.’s (1994) model, intentionality is only incidentally
relevant, representing one way in which events may be controllable.
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concern is that the concept of responsibility itself has taken on
a host of meanings in the literature and is therefore not an ideal
candidate for understanding moral judgment. Responsibility
sometimes indicates mere causality—for example, Harvey and
Rule (1978) examined “whether moral evaluations and causal
responsibility are distinct judgmental dimensions,” and Critchlow
(1985) found that responsibility and causality judgments were
similar across a range of behaviors. It can also denote general
obligations (e.g., “Who is responsible for cleaning up?”), or it can
simply be synonymous with blame (e.g., “Moral responsibility
refers to the extent to which the protagonist is worthy of blame”;
Shultz et al., 1981, p. 242, emphasis in original). Consequently,
responsibility either lacks clear moral content (e.g., when it
stands for causality) or is redundant with less ambiguous moral
judgments (e.g., blame). Recent models have therefore examined
less equivocal moral judgments while nonetheless incorporating
key insights from early responsibility models.
Cushman: Causal-intentional Model of
Wrongness and Blame
Cushman’s (2008) causal-intentional model aims to account
for distinct moral judgments of wrongness and blame. The
model (Cushman, 2008, p. 364), shown in Figure 1, asserts
that information about mental states underlies wrongness
judgments, whereas mental states and consequences/causality
jointly underlie blame judgments. More speciﬁcally, Cushman
argues that inferences about beliefs (whether the agent believed
his behavior would cause harm) and desires (whether the agent
wanted to cause harm) independently contribute to judgments
of both wrongness and blame. The joint presence of these two
mental states typically connotes that the behavior in question
was intentional (Malle and Knobe, 1997a), and whereas many
studies on moral judgment manipulate intentionality, Cushman
(2008) examines beliefs and desires independently. In addition to
these mental states, Cushman’s (2008) model holds that causes
and consequences (i.e., what actually happens as a result of an
agent’s action) inﬂuence blame. Agents may or may not actually
cause harm—regardless of their intent—and blame will track
the amount of harm (e.g., as in the diﬀerential punishment
assigned to actual vs. attempted murder, both of which imply
an intention to harm but diﬀer in whether the harm actually
occurred).
FIGURE 1 | Cushman’s causal-intentional model of moral judgment.
Reprinted from Cushman (2008) with permission from Elsevier.
Evidence for Cushman’s Causal-intentional Model
The importance of causality and intentionality inmoral judgment
is well established. Blame is greater to the extent that an
agent is seen as the cause of a negative event (Lagnado and
Channon, 2008), and a substantial body of evidence shows that
intentional negative actions are blamed and punished more
than unintentional negative actions (Darley and Shultz, 1990;
Ohtsubo, 2007; Gray et al., 2012). Further, culpable beliefs,
desires, and motives increase blame both among adults (Young
and Saxe, 2009; Tannenbaum et al., 2011; Inbar et al., 2012)
and among children (Suls and Kalle, 1978; Nelson-Le Gall, 1985;
Zelazo et al., 1996).
Cushman (2008) tested the model’s more speciﬁc claims by
independently varying belief, desire, and negative consequences,
and then probing wrongness and blame judgments. For example,
one vignette described Jenny, who was working in a sculpture
class with a partner. Jenny did [not] want to burn her partner
(desire present [absent]) and did [not] think that welding a
piece of metal would burn her partner (belief present [absent]);
Jenny welded the metal, which did [not] burn her partner
(consequence present [absent]). Wrongness judgments were
inﬂuenced by beliefs and desires but were essentially unaﬀected
by consequences. Blame judgments told a diﬀerent story: mental
states continued to be critical, but blame was additionally
inﬂuenced by consequences. Together, the results suggest that
whereas wrongness is guided solely by mental states, blame is
guided by mental states and consequences.
Other evidence for Cushman’s (2008) model comes from
studies on “outcome bias” or “moral luck,” the pattern whereby
an agent receives more blame for a behavior that happens to have
bad consequences than for one that does not (or for a behavior
whose bad consequences are worse than another’s). For example,
someone who carelessly backs out of a parking spot would receive
more blame if he happened to hit a bystander than if he happened
not to. A great deal of evidence reveals such outcome bias eﬀects.
For example, Mazzocco et al. (2004) found that while blame was
mostly predicted by mental states (negligence, in their studies), it
was partially predicted by negative outcomes too. Cushman et al.
(2009) showed that punishment of a person’s act of rolling a die
(which could produce negative, positive, or neutral outcomes)
was higher not only when the person intended to cause a bad
outcome but also when a bad outcome occurred by chance.
These patterns are consistent with Cushman’s model, showing
that blame is jointly a function of mental states and, to a lesser
extent, consequences.
Limitations of Cushman’s Model
Cushman highlights the role of consequences and causality,
which indeed shape blame. But whereas the model treats these
as identical inputs to blame (see Figure 1), in truth they refer to
very diﬀerent features. Consequences denote whether a negative
outcome in fact occurred; causality denotes whether the agent in
question was the cause of this outcome. The distinct roles of these
two factors can be illustrated by a pattern in Cushman’s (2008)
Study 3, which showed that people gave an agent more blame
when the agent caused harm than when the harm was caused
by someone else. In both cases, the negative consequences were
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identical; what diﬀered was whether the agent was the cause of
the consequences or not. This suggests that an agent’s causal role
in producing harmful consequences is more important for blame
than merely whether such consequences occurred.
One possibility not directly addressed by Cushman’s model
is that causal and intentional factors inﬂuence one another.
Appearing to contradict this possibility is Cushman’s ﬁnding
that mental states and consequences had no interaction eﬀect on
moral judgments. But Cushman’s vignettes manipulated mental
state and consequence information, making obvious the presence
or absence of each one. In contrast, people usually need to make
these inferences themselves, and information about one factor
will often guide inferences about another. For example, if a person
performs an action that she believes will cause harm, people will
tend to infer that she wanted to bring about harm (Reeder and
Brewer, 1979; Guglielmo and Malle, 2010; Laurent et al., 2015a).
Moreover, if an agent causes a negative outcome, people may infer
corresponding culpable mental states (Pettit and Knobe, 2009;
Young et al., 2010).
Summary of Information Models
Information models seek to characterize the critical information
elements that guide people’s moral judgments. Extant models
have examined a range of diﬀerent moral judgments, and
have identiﬁed key distinctions between them. Yet several
important consistencies have emerged. Moral judgments stem
from identifying the occurrence of a negative event and the causal
involvement of an agent. Moreover, perceivers consider whether
the agent acted intentionally, as well as the agent’s more speciﬁc
mental states such as desires (including reasons and motives)
and beliefs (including foresight and controllability). Notably, the
importance of these features emerges early in development. Six-
month olds generally dislike those who cause harm (Hamlin et al.,
2007) and 8-month olds are sensitive to intentions, preferring
an agent who intends to help over one who intends to harm
(Hamlin, 2013). Further, 8-month olds prefer that agents respond
with harmful behavior to an antisocial other (Hamlin et al., 2011),
illustrating a rudimentary understanding that certain reasons or
motives may permit an otherwise disfavored negative act. Lastly,
children are sensitive to an agent’s beliefs and the controllability
of behavior, viewing negligent harm as morally worse than purely
accidental harm (Darley and Shultz, 1990) and freely chosen
harm as worse than behaviorally constrained harm (Josephs et al.,
2015).
BIASED INFORMATION MODELS
Biased2 information models hold that although the critical
information elements identiﬁed by the preceding models—
causality, intentionality, and other mental states—may shape
explicit moral judgments such as blame, these elements are
themselves directly inﬂuenced by more implicit moral judgments
2“Bias” often carries normative connotations of error, but this is not the intended
meaning here, since the models reviewed in this section disagree about whether
their posited patterns reﬂect judgmental error. The current analysis invokes the
more neutral meaning of “bias,” merely connoting a particular tendency.
about the badness of an outcome or an agent (Alicke, 2000;
Knobe, 2010). These models reverse the order of judgment
postulated by information models in suggesting that moral
judgments can precede, rather than just result from, causal
and mental analysis. Although biased information models
are not strictly incompatible with the preceding information
models (since neither type explicitly denies the existence of the
processing order favored by the other type), these two types
clearly disagree about which processing order is most prevalent
and thus has the most explanatory power with respect to people’s
moral judgments.
Alicke: Culpable Control Model of Blame
Alicke’s (2000) culpable control model speciﬁes the impact of
“spontaneous evaluations” on causal and mental judgments
(Alicke refers to these judgments as “structural linkage
assessments”), as well as on blame. Spontaneous evaluations
are aﬀective reactions that arise “in response to information
concerning a person’s intentions, behaviors, or the consequences
they produce” (Alicke, 2000, p. 558). Structural linkage
assessments refer to judgments about mental states (e.g.,
intentions and foresight) and causality, which are of course
the key elements identiﬁed by information models. Alicke
(2000, p. 559, emphasis added) holds that “spontaneous
evaluations inﬂuence blame attributions both directly as well as
indirectly by means of their eﬀect on more deliberate structural
linkage assessments”. To facilitate comparison to other models,
“structural linkage assessments” are hereafter called “causal-
mental judgments.”
Clarifying the Predictions of Alicke’s Model
Although Alicke does not provide a full graphical depiction
of his model, we can construct one from his discussion
(Alicke, 2000, pp. 564–568) of ﬁve unique combinations
between spontaneous evaluations, blame, and causal-mental
judgments (e.g., spontaneous evaluations may directly inﬂuence
blame, but blame may have no further inﬂuence on causal-
mental judgments, etc.). Three combinations posit direct
eﬀects of spontaneous evaluations on blame; one posits
an indirect eﬀect (via causal-mental judgments); one posits
simultaneous direct and indirect eﬀects. Figure 2 combines
these into a single representation of Alicke’s model, whereby
the more proposed pathways between pairs of variables
(Alicke, 2000, p. 565), the thicker the arrow connecting
them. From this construction, we see that the spontaneous
evaluations → blame link is the strongest, followed by the
spontaneous evaluations → causal-mental judgments link, and
FIGURE 2 | Implied graphical representation of Alicke’s culpable
control model.
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the causal-mental judgments → blame link (the last two of
which constitute the indirect eﬀect of spontaneous evaluations
on blame). In short, Alicke’s model implies that the direct eﬀect
of spontaneous evaluations on blame is much larger than the
indirect eﬀect.
Once represented explicitly in this way, we see that the
model contains every pairwise connection between spontaneous
evaluations, blame, and causal-mental judgments. This quality—
that the model is “saturated”—makes model evaluation diﬃcult,
as saturated models accommodate every relationship and
therefore cannot by falsiﬁed on statistical grounds.3 To evaluate
Alicke’s model fairly, either the direct or the indirect eﬀect of
spontaneous evaluations on blame should be omitted, thereby
avoiding the problem of model saturation. Emphasizing the
direct eﬀect is consistent with the graphical implication of
Alicke’s model (Figure 2) and with the claim that perceivers
“search selectively for information that supports a desired
blame attribution” (Alicke, 2000, p. 568). In other words,
blame precedes and motivates assessments of mental states and
causality. Consequently, the strongest evidence for the model
will be evidence of a direct eﬀect of spontaneous evaluations on
blame; to the extent that the relationship is indirect (via causal-
mental judgments), this should not be taken as support for blame
validation.
Evidence for Alicke’s Culpable Control Model
Direct eﬀect
Alicke’s (2000) section on Direct Spontaneous Evaluation Eﬀects
reviewed a single study that found an eﬀect of outcome negativity
on blame that was not mediated by causality ratings (Alicke
et al., 1994). It is not clear, though, whether Alicke et al. (1994)
assessed ratings of causality, nor are mediation analyses reported.
Mazzocco et al. (2004) provide one of the few investigations
of the mediational model implied by Alicke’s model. In their
studies, a protagonist killed an intruder who turned out to be
either his daughter’s boyfriend or a dangerous criminal. The
critical prediction for Alicke’s (2000) model is that the direct
eﬀect (the outcome → blame path, after accounting for the eﬀect
of negligence on blame) should be stronger than the indirect
eﬀect (the negligence → blame path, after accounting for the
eﬀect of outcome on negligence). However, the results showed
the reverse: the indirect eﬀect was signiﬁcant in all four studies
(average r= 0.42), whereas the direct eﬀect was signiﬁcant in just
one study (average r =0.17).4
Alicke and Zell (2009) examined whether a protagonist’s
likeability—a possible measure of spontaneous evaluations—
inﬂuenced blame. In one study, a socially likeable agent (who
3Falsiﬁcation is possible by challenging the temporal or causal relationship between
variables, such as by showing that blame guides spontaneous evaluations (in
which case the term spontaneous evaluations would be a misnomer). This strategy
requires manipulation of variables, but blame and causal-mental judgments are
measured variables by deﬁnition. Further, few studies examine the timing of
these judgments, making it diﬃcult to challenge temporal relationships between
variables.
4Robbennolt’s (2000) meta-analysis of outcome bias eﬀects on blame also obtained
an average eﬀect size of r = 0.17. However, this represents the zero-order outcome
bias eﬀect (i.e., without controlling for any related inferences); the residual
outcome → blame path would surely reveal a smaller eﬀect size.
was polite to a policeman; volunteered at a homeless shelter) or
unlikeable agent (who was rude to a policeman; lied to his boss)
accidentally punched and injured an innocent woman. Blamewas
higher for the unlikeable character than the likeable one, and this
eﬀect was mediated by likeability ratings.
Indirect eﬀect
As we have seen, there is little existing evidence for a direct
eﬀect of spontaneous evaluations on blame, which is the primary
prediction of Alicke’s model. We can nonetheless consider the
evidence for an indirect eﬀect; if such an eﬀect stems from a
motivational bias, whereby people “want” to perceive greater
negligence (or causality, etc.), then this pattern may support
Alicke’s model.
Alicke (1992) found that an unlikeable agent (who was trying
to hide cocaine) was judged more causally responsible for his
ensuing car accident than was a likeable agent (who was trying
to hide a gift). Participants in Mazzocco et al.’s (2004) studies saw
an agent as more negligent when his actions had more negative
consequences (e.g., the intruder he killed was his daughter’s
boyfriend vs. a criminal). Similarly, Alicke et al. (1994) found
higher ratings of negligence and irresponsibility in the boyfriend
vs. criminal condition. In all cases, the claim of Alicke’s model is
that spontaneous evaluations—triggered by the negativity of the
agent and/or the outcome in question—led to enhanced ratings
of causality and negligence, which thereby enhance blame.
Limitations of Alicke’s Model
The major challenge to Alicke’s model is that its primary
claim of a direct eﬀect of spontaneous evaluations on blame
is not robustly supported. In a possible exception, Alicke and
Zell (2009) showed that likeability predicted blame, but the
assessed ratings of causality were not included in the mediation
models, leaving it unclear whether likability inﬂuenced blame
directly or indirectly (via causality). Further, the authors asked
about the agent’s “blameworthiness” in general (rather than for
the speciﬁc act of injuring the woman), making it possible
that the unlikeable agent received greater blame as a result
of performing additional negative actions (e.g., being rude,
lying).
Evidence consistently shows that the indirect eﬀect from
negative outcomes to blame—mediated by causal-mental
judgments—is stronger than the direct eﬀect. Could this indirect
eﬀect constitute an undue motivational bias? Alicke (2000,
p. 566) indeed argues that, “Although a victim’s loathsome
character is irrelevant for determining legal responsibility
(Federal Rules of Evidence, 2009, Rule 404b), there is little doubt
that a jury’s sympathies and antipathies for the victim inﬂuence
their verdicts.” Interestingly though, while Rule 404b forbids
character evidence from informing guilt directly, it does permit
such evidence to guide mental-state inferences: “Evidence of
other crimes, wrongs, or acts. . .may, however, be admissible for
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.”
This legally permissible pattern of inﬂuence may explain how
negative character or outcome information, which is generally
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more diagnostic than positive information (Reeder and Brewer,
1979; Skowronski and Carlston, 1987, 1989), shapes causal-
mental judgments. People might (reasonably) infer that the
drug-hiding agent in Alicke’s (1992) car accident story was
more reckless, impulsive, or apathetic than the gift-hiding agent,
and these inferences may help account for the discrepancy
in assessments of causality. Similarly, negative outcomes often
bring to bear other inferences about foresight or preventability.
When an agent mistakenly kills his daughter’s boyfriend (as
in Alicke et al., 1994), participants might infer that the agent
could or should have known about the boyfriend’s presence,
thus blaming the agent for his unwarranted false belief that
the intruder was a criminal. Consistent with this interpretation,
Young et al. (2010) showed that people assign substantial blame
to agents who act upon false beliefs, regardless of whether they
ultimately caused harm. The inﬂuence of negative outcome or
character information on causal-mental judgments is therefore
likely informational, notmotivational, since negative information
is a diagnostic indicator of related inferences about dispositions,
foresight, and preventability (cf. Uttich and Lombrozo, 2010).
Alicke’s model nonetheless raises the important possibility
that early aﬀective responses may impact later phases of moral
judgment. Future research must be careful to determine whether
this link is aﬀective/motivational or informational in nature. If
it turns out to be the former, then information models of moral
judgment will need to specify how early evaluative responses
shape later judgments (e.g., causal-mental judgments and blame).
Knobe: Moral Pervasiveness Model
Knobe’s moral pervasiveness model (Pettit and Knobe, 2009;
Knobe, 2010) depicted in Figure 3 (adapted from Phillips
and Knobe, 2009) asserts that “initial moral judgments”
inﬂuence causal-mental judgments. Knobe’s (2003a,b) earliest
work suggested that initial moral judgments were judgments of
blame; more recent speciﬁcations view them as akin to judgments
of goodness or badness: “people’s judgments of good and bad
are actually playing a role in the fundamental competencies
underlying their concept of intentional action.” (Knobe, 2006,
p. 221). Knobe’s model posits that initial moral judgments
inﬂuence all the components identiﬁed by information models,
including intentionality (as well as desires, beliefs, or decisions;
Knobe, 2010), causality (Knobe and Fraser, 2008) and reasons for
acting (Knobe, 2007).
Whereas Alicke’s account is that rudimentary initial moral
judgments can guide causal-mental inferences, Knobe’s account
is that the very concepts underlying these inferences are
fundamentally shaped by moral concerns: “Moral judgment is
pervasive; playing a role in the application of every concept
that involves holding or displaying a positive attitude toward an
FIGURE 3 | Knobe’s moral pervasiveness model.
outcome” (Pettit and Knobe, 2009, p. 593). Thus, both models
posit that people have immediate evaluative reactions, which then
inﬂuence their causal-mental assessments. Alicke holds that this
is a motivational process of blame-validation, whereby people
exaggerate their causal-mental judgments to justify their initial
negative evaluations. In contrast, Knobe holds that these eﬀects
reﬂect a conceptual inﬂuence—by virtue of viewing an action
as bad, people directly perceive more culpable causal-mental
features.
Evidence for Knobe’s Moral Pervasiveness Model
Knobe’s model is supported by previously reviewed evidence
for (indirect) eﬀects of negativity on blame that are mediated
by causal-mental judgments. For example, Mazzocco et al.
(2004) showed a strong outcome → blame eﬀect that was
mediated by negligence judgments, consistent with Knobe’s claim
that negativity enhances culpable mental state judgments (and,
thereby, blame).
The most widely known evidence for Knobe’s model comes
from the “side-eﬀect eﬀect” (Leslie et al., 2006), whereby people
view negative side eﬀects as more intentional than positive ones.
In the original demonstration of the eﬀect (Knobe, 2003a), a
CEO adopted a program that increased proﬁts, with a side
eﬀect of harming [helping] the environment. The CEO stated,
“I don’t care at all about harming [helping] the environment,”
thereby putatively indicating a lack of desire for the side eﬀect.
Most people said that harming the environment was intentional
but helping was unintentional, a pattern that has emerged
across variations in age and vignette content (Leslie et al., 2006;
Cushman and Mele, 2008; Mallon, 2008).
Other evidence shows that morality appears to impact a host
of other non-moral judgments. People more often judged that
the harming CEO, as compared to the helping CEO, intended
the outcome (Knobe, 2004; McCann, 2005), knew about the
outcome (Beebe and Buckwalter, 2010), decided to bring about
the outcome, and was in favor of the outcome (Pettit and Knobe,
2009). Moral judgments also appear to inﬂuence assessments of
causality (Knobe and Fraser, 2008) and freedom (Phillips and
Knobe, 2009) in a similar fashion.
Limitations of Knobe’s Model
One challenge to Knobe’s account is that the harming and
helping CEO scenarios diﬀer not only in moral valence but
also in the agent’s implied attitude toward that outcome.
Since people expect others to prevent negative events and
foster positive ones, professed indiﬀerence about an outcome
constitutes evidence of a welcoming attitude when the outcome
is negative but not when it is positive. Adjusting these
mismatched attitudes by making the harming CEO less
welcoming and the helping CEO more welcoming led people
to judge the two actions as equally intentional (Guglielmo
and Malle, 2010). Moreover, people rarely said the side eﬀect
was intentional once given other options of describing the
situation; they instead indicated that the CEO knowingly brought
about the outcome, and this pattern was identical for the
harming and helping scenarios (Guglielmo and Malle, 2010;
Laurent et al., 2015b). These ﬁndings challenge the claim
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that moral judgments impact the “fundamental competencies
underlying [people’s] concept of intentional action” (Knobe,
2006, p. 221).
Knobe’s model does not specify what initial moral judgments
actually are and therefore what triggers them. The model
requires that these judgments are not shaped by causal-mental
inferences, since such inferences are themselves posited to be
guided by initial moral judgments. By virtue of what, then, do
initial moral judgments arise? The clearest possibility is that
these “judgments of good and bad” are driven by outcomes or
consequences. However, several experimental variations reveal
low intentionality ratings despite the presence of a bad outcome,
such as when the agent “felt terrible” about the outcome
(Phelan and Sarkissian, 2008; see also Cushman and Mele,
2008). Even the paradigmatic side-eﬀect eﬀect requires not
just the occurrence of a negative outcome but also the agent’s
knowledge that it will occur; when this knowledge is absent,
people rarely judge the outcome intentional (Nadelhoﬀer, 2006;
Pellizzoni et al., 2010). Thus, the initial moral judgments of
Knobe’s model are sensitive at least to the agent’s knowledge and
attitude (Guglielmo, 2010), challenging the claim that such moral
judgments occur prior to and without consideration of an agent’s
mental states.
A ﬁnal challenge is that many of the moral pervasiveness
patterns likewise emerge for non-moral norm violations. This
is because breaking a norm (moral or otherwise) provides
diagnostic evidence of the agent’s desires, intentions, and causal
role (Jones and Davis, 1965; Harman, 1976; Machery, 2008). For
example, people judged it more intentional to break rather than
conform to a dress code (Guglielmo and Malle, 2010), or to
make unconventionally rather than conventionally colored toys
(Uttich and Lombrozo, 2010). Puzzlingly, Knobe has sometimes
emphasized norm violation in general (Knobe, 2007; Hitchcock
and Knobe, 2009), and other times moral violation in particular
(Pettit and Knobe, 2009; Knobe, 2010). In one striking study
that pitted norm violation against morality (Knobe, 2007), the
side eﬀect of the CEO’s action was either violation of a Nazi
law (a good but norm-violating outcome) or conformity to the
law (a bad but norm-conforming outcome). People viewed the
norm-violating (but good) outcome as intentional far more often
(81%) than the norm-conforming (but bad) outcome (30%),
demonstrating the supremacy of norm violation over moral
concerns.
Summary of Biased Information Models
Biased information models raise the intriguing possibility
that causal-mental assessments—which are typically viewed
as inputs to moral judgment—are themselves driven by
more basic moral judgments. However, the current analysis
suggests that this fundamental claim of biased information
models is not, at present, well supported. For one, these
models have not empirically assessed the operative early moral
judgments. Moreover, although negativity impacts non-moral
assessments, this pattern can often be accounted for without
appealing to motivational or conceptual inﬂuences. Norm-
violating information provides grounds for related diagnostic
inferences. Consequently, the patterns predicted by biased
information models emerge even for non-moral norm violations,
and the patterns for moral violations become far weaker when
controlling for the relevant diagnostic information.
PROCESSING MODELS
The models reviewed so far are concerned primarily with
the information components that underlie moral judgments.
A distinct set of models—here called processing models—has
a diﬀerent emphasis, instead focusing on the psychological
processes that are recruited when people determine whether
a behavior is immoral or worthy of blame. Although many
possible forms of processing might be examined, the literature
has typically examined two putatively competing types: intuitive
or emotional processes on the one hand, and deliberative or
reason-based processes on the other.
Haidt: Social Intuitionist Model of Moral
Judgment
Haidt’s (2001, p. 815) Social Intuitionist Model, shown in
Figure 4, asserts that “moral judgment is caused by quick moral
intuitions and is followed (when needed) by slow, ex post facto
moral reasoning” (p. 817). This statement contains two distinct
claims about the intuitive nature of moral judgment. One is
a “negative” claim that reasoning usually does not precede,
but rather follows from, moral judgment. This claim, shown
in Figure 4 as the post hoc reasoning link, challenges the
long tradition of reason-based moral judgment models (Kant,
1785/1959; Piaget, 1932/1965; Kohlberg, 1969; Turiel, 1983). The
second, “positive,” claim is that intuitions or emotional responses
directly cause moral judgments (the intuitive judgment link).
The eliciting situation element of Haidt’s model denotes
the kinds of situations that are apt to generate moral
intuitions and, therefore, moral judgments. Recent research
on these “taste buds” of morality (Haidt and Joseph, 2007)
suggests that there are ﬁve broad moral domains: harm,
fairness, ingroup, authority, and purity (Graham et al., 2009;
Haidt and Graham, 2009; Haidt and Kesebir, 2010). It
remains to be seen whether the fundamental links in Haidt’s
model between intuition, judgment, and reasoning are true
FIGURE 4 | Haidt’s Social Intuitionist Model of moral judgment.
Reprinted from Haidt (2001) with permission from APA.
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for each of these ﬁve moral domains; most evidence for
the model, as we will see, comes from studies examining
purity.
Close inspection reveals that Haidt emphasizes a diﬀerent
type of moral judgment than that examined by information
models. Information models assume or stipulate that the moral
judgment process begins with the identiﬁcation of a negative
event (e.g., a particular harmful outcome), and thus causal-
mental judgments are relevant only insofar as they tie an
agent to the event. In contrast, Haidt’s model arguably assesses
how people determine what constitutes a negative event in
the ﬁrst place. Studies of Haidt’s model always hold constant
the agent’s causal and intentional involvement, so observed
diﬀerences in moral judgments can be ascribed not to these
factors but to whether perceivers viewed the behaviors as
negative.
Evidence for Haidt’s Social Intuitionist Model
Haidt’s (2001) model can be supported by two distinct lines of
evidence: one corresponding to the post hoc reasoning claim that
moral reasoning follows moral judgment, and one to the intuitive
judgment claim that intuitive or emotional responses directly
guide moral judgments.
Post hoc reasoning
Reasoning processes are sometimes deployed to obtain
conﬁrmation for favored conclusions, rather than to discover
truth. Kunda (1990) illustrated a host of domains where such
motivated reasoning occurs. Strikingly, the vast majority
of these domains concern self-relevant judgments—for
example, people are inclined to seek, believe, and remember
information that depicts themselves as smarter, healthier, and
more socially desirable (Kunda, 1990; Mercier and Sperber,
2011). But judgments are typically deﬁned as moral if they have
“disinterested elicitors,” thus lacking immediate self-relevance
(Haidt, 2003). Consequently, to evaluate whether post hoc
reasoning drives moral judgments, we must consider cases in
which the judgments have no direct self-relevance.
In such cases, people’s moral judgments can indeed inﬂuence
subsequent reasoning processes in a motivated manner. When
people see an issue in moral terms, they view tradeoﬀs about
the issue as impermissible or taboo (Tetlock, 2003), and their
judgments fall prey to various framing eﬀects (Ritov and Baron,
1999; Sunstein, 2005; but see Connolly and Reb, 2003; Tanner
and Medin, 2004). Moral judgments can also bias judgments of
procedural justice, whereby people view judicial proceedings as
more fair to the extent the outcomes are consistent with their
own moral views (Skitka and Houston, 2001; Skitka, 2002). In
general, these studies illustrate that motivated reasoning can
work in the service of moral judgments, buttressing judgments
that perceivers have already made. But the critical claim of
Haidt’s model involves the process of arriving at moral judgments
themselves.
Perhaps the most compelling method of evaluating Haidt’s
claim that reasoning follows moral judgments is to jointly
probe these judgments and the supporting reasons that people
provide for them. Using this method, studies have shown that
people sometimes judge behaviors wrong but seemingly cannot
provide justiﬁcatory reasons, illustrating a phenomenon dubbed
“moral dumbfounding” (Haidt et al., unpublished). Participants
in Haidt et al.’s (unpublished) study read stories designed to
depict disgusting yet harmless actions (e.g., consensual incest;
eating a disease-free human cadaver), and although many people
judged the actions to be wrong, they sometimes directly stated
that they could not explain why. Haidt and Hersh (2001) reported
similar results for harmless sexual behaviors (homosexual sex,
unusual masturbation, and incest). Participants assigned a
moderate amount of moral condemnation, and dumbfounding
was observed among 49% of conservatives (and 33% of liberals).
Cushman et al. (2006) adopted a related approach by assessing
people’s justiﬁcations for three principles—the action, intention,
and contact principles5—that underlie their moral judgments.
Participants had to justify patterns of judgments that conformed
to the principles (e.g., that an action story was morally worse
than an omission story), whereby suﬃcient justiﬁcations cited
“a factual diﬀerence between the two cases and either claimed
or implied that it was the basis of his or her judgments.”
(Cushman et al., 2006, p. 1084). Any other justiﬁcations can
be considered insuﬃcient and are akin to instances of moral
dumbfounding. Cushman et al. (2006) reported a sizeable
proportion of dumbfounding for the intention principle (68%),
but dumbfounding was less prevalent for the contact (40%) and
action principles (19%).
Intuitive judgment
The second key claim of Haidt’s model is that intuitions or
emotions directly inﬂuence moral judgments. Participants in
Haidt et al. (1993) read stories describing harmless actions
that were disgusting (e.g., having sex with a dead chicken,
then cooking and eating it) or disrespectful (e.g., cleaning the
bathroom with a cut up national ﬂag), and their reported negative
aﬀect better predicted their moral judgments than did their
judgments of harm. Similarly, Haidt and Hersh (2001) and Haidt
et al. (unpublished) showed that wrongness judgments were
better predicted by “gut feelings” or negative aﬀect than by harm
judgments.
Wheatley and Haidt (2005) hypnotized participants to feel
disgusted by certain key words, then had them read moral
violations, half of which contained the hypnotic disgust word.
Participants rated the actions as more morally wrong when
the hypnotic disgust word was present. Schnall et al. (2008)
report similar ﬁndings: participants who were induced to feel
disgusted (e.g., with a fart spray or disgusting ﬁlm clip)
made more severe moral judgments than control participants,
although this was true only for people highly conscious of
their own physical sensations. Eskine et al. (2011) found
that people judged behaviors as more morally wrong after
ﬁrst drinking a bitter beverage, as opposed to a sweet or
neutral one (but this pattern obtained only among conservative
participants).
5The action principle holds that harm caused by action is worse than harm caused
by omission; the intention principle holds that intended harm is worse than harm
brought about as a side-eﬀect; the contact principle holds that harm caused by
physical contact is worse than harm caused without physical contact.
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Limitations of Haidt’s Model
The evidence for Haidt’s model may not be widely generalizable
to many types of moral violations or intuitions. Although
Haidt’s deﬁnition of intuition appeals to a broad evaluative
distinction between good and bad, most attempts to manipulate
aﬀective-based intuitions have focused on disgust speciﬁcally
(Wheatley and Haidt, 2005; Schnall et al., 2008; Eskine et al.,
2011). Similarly, most scenarios used to test Haidt’s model
have involved disgust-based violations (e.g., Haidt et al., 1993;
Haidt and Hersh, 2001; Haidt et al., unpublished). Widespread
focus on disgust may overstate the role of intuition and the
presence of dumbfounding. Disgust is elicited by the mere
occurrence of a norm violation, whereas other moral emotions—
such as anger—respond to the agent’s intentions (Russell and
Giner-Sorolla, 2011a). People thus have diﬃculty justifying
feelings of disgust but not feelings of anger (Russell and
Giner-Sorolla, 2011b), suggesting that moral dumbfounding may
be far less prevalent in non-purity domains. Indeed, when
examining harmful behaviors, Cushman et al. (2006) observed
dumbfounding in a majority of participants for just one of three
moral judgment principles (the other dumbfounding rates were
as low as 19%).
Even when focusing speciﬁcally on disgust, recent evidence
provides a strong challenge to the claim that moral judgment
is driven primarily by intuition or emotion. In a meta-analysis
of over 50 studies, Landy and Goodwin (2015) report that the
eﬀect of induced disgust on moral judgment is veriﬁable but
small (d= 0.11), and it disappears once correcting for publication
bias. Furthermore, the paradigmatic cases of putatively harmless
purity violations (e.g., Haidt et al., unpublished) are typically not
perceived as harmless, which thereby explains people’s persistence
in deeming them wrong (Gray et al., 2014; Royzman et al., 2015).
Lastly, studies of Haidt’s model typically ask participants
whether behaviors are wrong, rather than morally wrong (Haidt
et al., 1993; Haidt and Hersh, 2001; Schnall et al., 2008; Haidt
et al., unpublished). These judgments, however, are distinct. Inbar
et al. (2009) found that 45% of people said there was something
“wrong with couples French kissing in public,” which likely
reﬂects not judgments ofmoral wrongness, but rather judgments
of social-conventional violation.6 Consistent with this suggestion
that wrongness may not always have moral connotations, people
are more willing to describe negative actions as “wrong” than
as “morally wrong” (O’Hara et al., 2010). Importantly, this
is not true for blame: people did not diﬀerentially describe
negative actions as “blameworthy” versus “morally blameworthy”
(O’Hara et al., 2010). Whereas blame has unambiguously moral
connotations, wrongness does not.
Greene: Dual Process Model of Moral
Judgment
Greene’s (2007, 2013) model asserts that moral judgments are
driven not just by intuitive/emotional processes but also by
conscious reasoning processes. This dual process distinction has
6Moreover, the question wording in this and other studies (“Is there anything
wrong with. . .?”) sets a low threshold for assent and may thus elicit artiﬁcially high
endorsement.
FIGURE 5 | Greene’s dual-process model of moral judgment.
been proposed as a domain-general account of human cognition
(Epstein, 1994; Sloman, 1996; Slovic et al., 2004; but see Keren
and Schul, 2009). Critically, Greene’s (2007) model , shown in
Figure 5, posits that these two processes underlie diﬀerent types
of moral judgment: “deontological judgments, judgments that are
naturally regarded as reﬂecting concerns for rights and duties,
are driven primarily by intuitive emotional responses,” whereas
“consequentialist judgments, judgments aimed at promoting the
greater good, are supported by controlled cognitive processes
that look more like moral reasoning” (Paxton and Greene, 2010,
p. 513).7
Evidence for Greene’s Dual-process Model
Greene’smodel was inspired by a pair of moral dilemmas in which
a runaway trolley is on course to kill ﬁve innocent workers. In the
switch scenario, the hypothetical intervention is ﬂipping a switch
to divert the trolley onto a side track, killing a single worker tied to
the tracks. In the footbridge scenario, the intervention is pushing
a large man over a footbridge, stopping the trolley, and killing the
man. Although both actions save ﬁve people and kill one, most
people deem the switch intervention to be permissible and thus
consistent with consequentialism but the footbridge intervention
to be impermissible and thus inconsistent with consequentialism
(Foot, 1967; Thomson, 1985; Petrinovich et al., 1993; Greene
et al., 2001; Hauser et al., 2007). The explanation, according
to Greene’s (2007, p. 43) model, is that “people tend toward
consequentialism in the case in which the emotional response
is low and tend toward deontology in the case in which the
emotional response is high.”
Initial evidence for this model came from a seminal fMRI
study by Greene et al. (2001) that compared “personal” dilemmas
like footbridge, wherein the action involved direct bodily harm, to
“impersonal” dilemmas like switch. Brain regions associated with
emotional processing exhibited greater activation for personal
than impersonal dilemmas, whereas regions associated with
working memory showed greater activation for impersonal than
personal dilemmas. People also took longer to judge personal
actions appropriate than inappropriate, suggesting that it takes
additional time to override the dominant emotionally aversive
response.
7The model also posits that the emotion → consequentialism connection and the
reasoning → deontology connection—depicted in Figure 5 as dashed lines—are
possible but rare.
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If emotion underlies deontological judgments speciﬁcally,
then counteracting people’s negative emotional responses should
increase the acceptability of personal actions. Indeed, participants
judged the footbridge action (but not the switch action) to
be more appropriate after watching a funny video (Valdesolo
and DeSteno, 2006). Patients with damage to the VMPFC,
which is critical for healthy emotional functioning, have
dulled physiological responses when considering harmful actions
(Moretto et al., 2010) and are therefore more likely than controls
to judge personal actions appropriate (Ciaramelli et al., 2007;
Koenigs et al., 2007). In contrast, control participants show
strong emotional aversion to engaging even in simulated harmful
behavior, which predicts their rejection of hypothetical personal
actions (Cushman et al., 2012).
If conscious reasoning underlies consequentialist judgments
speciﬁcally, then taxing people’s cognitive processing capacities
should impact these judgments. Consistent with this prediction,
Greene et al. (2008) showed that whereas the frequency and
speed of deontological judgments were unchanged by cognitive
load, consequentialist judgments were slower with cognitive load
than without. Relatedly, Conway and Gawronski (2013) found
that cognitive load selectively weakened consequentialist (but
not deontological) judgments. These ﬁndings are diﬃcult to
explain on Haidt’s model—if judgments are driven by immediate
intuitive responses, then cognitive load should not aﬀect the
speed or content of these judgments. Moreover, participants in
Greene et al.’s (2008) study made consequentialist judgments
about personal actions 60% of the time, which also presents a
challenge for Haidt’s model, as it suggests substantial deliberative
reasoning despite the highly emotional content of these personal
actions.
Limitations of Greene’s Model
Greene’s model may overstate the role of emotion in moral
judgment by often probing ﬁrst-person judgments (e.g., “Is it
appropriate for you to. . .”), rather than third-person judgments.
People respond more deontologically when considering their
own actions (Nadelhoﬀer and Feltz, 2008). Thus, heightened
emotional responses may be driven partially by the personal
implications of the action (e.g., possible punishment, impression
management), rather than purely by features of the action itself
(cf. Mikhail, 2008). In fact, Borg et al. (2006) have noted that
several brain regions implicated by Greene et al. (2001, 2004) are
likewise involved in self-referential processing.
Further, the personal/impersonal distinction is coarse and
perhaps inaccurate (Mikhail, 2007; McGuire et al., 2009), as it
is not clear which features diﬀerentiate these categories, nor
whether people consistently respond to them in the predicted
fashion. McGuire et al. (2009) reanalyzed Greene et al.’s (2001)
response time ﬁndings and showed that the diﬀerences were
driven by a small subset of outlier personal dilemmas, which
were uniformly (and quickly) judged inappropriate. Greene
(2009) now agrees that the criteria distinguishing personal from
impersonal actions are inadequate but notes that the veracity of
the dual-process model does not depend on this. The model’s
key claim (Greene, 2009) is that emotional and deliberative
processes lead, respectively, to deontological and consequentialist
judgments, however, these processes are elicited initially. This is
true, but it seems to weaken Greene’s model, as it cannot predict
the diﬀerential elicitation of these distinct processes.
A ﬁnal challenge regards the utility of the distinction between
deontological and consequentialist judgments. Recent evidence
indicates that the supposedly consequentialist judgments
revealed by classic moral dilemmas are more closely linked to
egoist concerns than to concerns about the greater good (Kahane
et al., 2015; see also Bartels and Pizarro, 2011). These ﬁndings
add to a growing concern that moral dilemma scenarios may fail
to adequately capture everyday moral judgment (Bloom, 2011;
Bauman et al., 2014).
Summary of Processing Models
Processing models seek to describe the psychological processes
that give rise to moral judgments. Haidt argues that intuition
alone drives most moral judgments, whereas Greene argues
that both intuition and reasoning are critical. We can better
understand these discrepant claims and ﬁndings by invoking
the principles identiﬁed by information models. Studies of
Haidt’s model primarily examine cases in which an agent acts
intentionally, without apparent exculpatory justiﬁcation; the
key question for perceivers is therefore whether the act itself
was negative. This norm-violation detection is often intuitive,
and since the other information elements are held constant—
causality and intentionality present, justiﬁcation absent—no
further information processing is required and moral judgments
also appear intuitive. In contrast, studies of Greene’s model
primarily examine cases in which an agent performs an
intentional action that is indisputably negative, such as killing
an innocent person; the key question for perceivers is therefore
whether the action is justiﬁed by its positive consequences. These
studies show that some actions are more easily justiﬁed (e.g.,
those not involving direct physical harm) and that reasoning
often drives this process of considering justiﬁcations. Taken
together, intuition is prominent when detecting initial norm
violations, and conscious reasoning is prominent when weighing
these early intuitive responses against potential countervailing
considerations. As such, intuition and reasoning are both
critical for moral judgment, but their relevance emerges
in diﬀerent ways and at diﬀerent stages of the judgment
process.
INTEGRATION AND CONCLUSION
This article has reviewed dominant models of moral judgment,
organizing them in a theoretical framework of information
processing that has been widely inﬂuential in models of
cognitive psychology (Rosch, 1978; Marr, 1982) but neglected
in models of morality. This framework aims to specify the
information elements that shape moral judgments and the
psychological processes that bring these judgments to bear.
Information models address the ﬁrst aim, identifying the
particular information features that guide moral judgments
(Shaver, 1985; Schlenker et al., 1994; Weiner, 1995; Cushman,
2008). These models examine a variety of moral judgments
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(e.g., blame, wrongness, responsibility) and emphasize diﬀerent
elements, but they coalesce around several key points. Central
to moral judgments are variations in causality, intentionality,
and mental states more generally, including beliefs, desires,
and reasons or motives. Unintentional negative behaviors often
receive substantial moral condemnation, particularly when they
are preventable or controllable. Moral judgments are therefore
guided by information about both the outcome and the mind.
A related set of models—biased information models—
hold that the elements identiﬁed by information models are
themselves guided by more basic moral judgments (Alicke,
2000; Knobe, 2010), such that negative events lead perceivers
to make more culpable causal-mental judgments. Alicke oﬀers
a motivational explanation for this pattern: negative events
trigger blame-validation, whereby perceivers inﬂate causal-
mental judgments to justify initial negative feelings. Knobe oﬀers
a conceptual explanation: negative events fundamentally shape
the way that people perceive mental states and causality. But
these models face a central unresolved issue. Negative events, as
instances of norm violations, often provide diagnostic evidence of
an agent’s beliefs, motives, and intentions. Future research must
therefore clarify whether such eﬀects are attributable to morality
per se or to concomitant informational elements.
Processing models specify the psychological processes that
generate moral judgments, and existing models have primarily
been interested in a dichotomy between intuition and reasoning
(Haidt, 2001; Greene, 2007). These models endorse a central,
and sometimes exclusive, role of intuition. To some degree, this
should be unsurprising, as any judgment can be traced to a
ﬁrst principle that cannot be further justiﬁed. Just as people
would have diﬃculty justifying their dislike of the color yellow
(“it’s just ugly”), they will likewise have diﬃculty justifying why
certain actions—such as committing incest or causing physical
harm—constitute moral violations (“they’re just wrong”) (cf.
Mallon and Nichols, 2011). Intuition is therefore prominent in
detecting initial norm violations, or determining that something
bad happened. Moral judgments themselves will also be intuitive
when critical information elements concerning intentionality,
justiﬁcations, and mental states are unambiguous and constant.
In contrast, when these elements are equivocal or conﬂicting
(e.g., when there is a potential justiﬁcation for an initial negative
event), moral judgments are additionally reliant on deliberate
reasoning.
An Information Processing Model of
Moral Judgment
Moral judgments, like any others, fundamentally involve
information processing, but existing models have typically
examined either the information or the processing aspect of
these judgments. A successful integrative model will be one
that examines the relevant psychological processes as they
relate not merely to eventual moral judgments themselves but
to constitutive information elements. The subsequent sections
examine how the insights of processing models apply to
two distinct elements of information models—norm-violation
detection and causal-mental analysis—and then discuss a recent
a recent model, the Path Model of Blame (Malle et al., 2014), that
adopts an integrative information processing approach.
Processes of Norm-violation Detection
For people to levy a moral judgment, they must ﬁrst detect
that a negative event has occurred—that some norm has been
violated. Such norm-violation detection usually occurs quickly
and triggers aﬀective or evaluative responses (Ito et al., 1998; Van
Berkum et al., 2009). Studies of Haidt’s model best exemplify the
intuitive nature of this detection, showing that people easily, and
sometimes without conscious justiﬁcations, classify particular
behaviors as instances of moral violations (Haidt, 2001; Haidt and
Hersh, 2001).
The critical ﬁndings of biased information models further
support the intuitive basis of norm-violation detection. These
models oﬀer two key claims: ﬁrst, that people identify negative
events rapidly, in the form of spontaneous evaluations (Alicke,
2000) or initial moral judgments (Knobe, 2010); and second,
that event negativity directly inﬂuences causal-mental judgments.
Although the current analysis has challenged the second claim,
the ﬁrst claim is undisputed and strongly supported. This process
of identifying an initial negative event or norm violation is also
a stated or assumed aspect of information models (Shaver, 1985;
Schlenker et al., 1994; Weiner, 1995; Cushman, 2008).
Processes of Causal and Mental Analysis
Identifying a negative event is only the ﬁrst step en route to a
moral judgment. It subsequently triggers an explanatory search
for the causes of and reasons for the event (Malle and Knobe,
1997b; Wong and Weiner, 1981); and as several models have
demonstrated, moral judgments are shaped by these causal-
mental considerations (Cushman, 2008; Guglielmo et al., 2009;
Gray et al., 2012), such as whether the event was intentional and
what the agent’smore speciﬁc mental states were (beliefs, reasons,
or motives).
The processes used to infer causality and mental states are
varied and complex, including covariational and counterfactual
reasoning, perspective taking, projection, and stereotyping
(Hilton, 1990; Ames, 2004; Sloman et al., 2009; Waytz et al.,
2010; Alicke et al., in press). These processes are triggered
when the causal and mental features of the event at hand
are (partially) ambiguous or conﬂicting, as in most naturalistic
instances of moral judgment. In these cases, deliberative
processes will often drive causal-mental analysis and, thus,
moral judgments themselves. Studies of Greene’s model illustrate
this pattern, showing that conscious reasoning substantially
guides moral judgment when strong positive justiﬁcations
conﬂict with highly negative norm violations. In contrast, when
causal-mental features are unambiguous or non-conﬂicting,
as in most studies of Haidt’s model, there is little need
for deliberate reasoning; norm-violation detection and moral
judgment become inseparable and largely intuitive.
Consequently, there is no compelling evidence that moral
judgments are inherently either intuitive or deliberative. Which
process dominates will depend on the nature and strength of the
information regarding causality, intentionality, andmental states;
but regardless of which process dominates, this causal-mental
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information is nonetheless considered (cf. Kruglanski and
Gigerenzer, 2011). Ambiguous or conﬂicting information elicits
deliberative processing, as when, for example, evaluating a
genuine moral dilemma in which multiple courses of action
involve diﬀerent outcomes, tradeoﬀs, or motives for acting;
unequivocal or non-conﬂicting information elicits intuitive
processing, as when evaluating a single course of action for
which someone’s motives are clearly speciﬁed or easily assumed
(Monin et al., 2007). Researchers typically choose the strength
and ambiguity of this information in service of particular
theoretical perspectives. Subtle linguistic diﬀerences can help
illustrate the point: “Smith was dead” leaves unspeciﬁed a
perpetrator’s causal and intentional involvement (likely triggering
more deliberate analysis of these features), whereas “Smith
was murdered” obviates the need for deliberate analysis of
causality and intentionality (although it may trigger analysis
of the agent’s motives). Casting further doubt on attempts to
characterize moral judgment as either intuitive or deliberative
is the fact that even when judgments appear to be intuitive,
this may actually reﬂect the automatization of prior conscious
reasoning (Pizarro and Bloom, 2003; Mallon and Nichols,
2011).
The Path Model of Blame
A recent model, the Path Model of Blame (Malle et al., 2014;
see Figure 6), adopts an explicit information processing view
of moral judgment by considering the distinct processes of
norm-violation detection and causal-mental analysis, and by
specifying how information acquisition and integration underlie
blame judgments. The model asserts that blame is initiated
by the detection of a negative event or outcome (personal
injury, environmental harm, and so on), which is typically an
intuitive process. Perceivers then consider various information
components en route to blame, but they do so in a particular
FIGURE 6 | Malle et al.’s Path Model of Blame. Reprinted from Malle et al.
(2014) with permission from Taylor and Francis Ltd.
processing order, which can manifest via either intuitive or
deliberative processing. Perceivers assess the causality of the
negative event in question and then, if it was agent-caused, they
consider whether it was intentional. From there, blame unfolds
via diﬀerent paths: if the event is perceived to be intentional,
perceivers consider the agent’s reasons or motives for acting;
if perceived to be unintentional, perceivers consider the agent’s
obligation and capacity to prevent the event.
The Path Model has notable similarities with several
information models, particularly in recognizing the importance
of the speciﬁc features of causality (Shaver, 1985; Weiner,
1995; Cushman, 2008), intentionality (Shaver, 1985; Cushman,
2008), reasons (Shaver, 1985), and preventability (Schlenker
et al., 1994; Weiner, 1995). Like Cushman’s (2008) model, the
Path Model also makes explicit that unintentional negative
behavior can receive substantial blame. However, the Path Model
extends previous models by specifying a processing hierarchy
of information features, by identifying separate paths to blame
depending on intentionality, and by clarifying how both intuitive
and deliberative processes can shape blame. Recent evidence
supports the information processing structure of the Path Model.
In particular, when people ﬁnd out about negative events and
have an opportunity to acquire additional information, they do so
in the order that the model posits, and this holds true even when
they face strong time pressure and thus must rely on intuitive
processing (Guglielmo and Malle, under review).
THE FUTURE OF MORAL PSYCHOLOGY:
DIRECTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
Conceptualizing moral judgment in a framework of information
processing facilitates a synthesis of previous research, helping
to clarify the claims of existing models and illustrate their
interconnections. Such a framework can likewise help guide
future research, particularly by focusing on the aﬀective basis of
moral judgment, by diversifying the stimuli and methodologies
used to study moral judgment, and by remaining grounded to
the descriptive and functional questions of how and why our
moral judgments operate as they do, rather than the normative
questions of whether they operate correctly.
Affect and Emotion
There is much debate concerning role of emotion in moral
judgment. Researchers do not consistently disentangle intuitive
judgment from emotion-inﬂuenced judgment; and though
evidence for the former is relatively strong, evidence for the
latter is weaker and has many possible theoretical interpretations
(Chapman and Anderson, 2011; Pizarro et al., 2011; Landy
and Goodwin, 2015). Emotionally arousing actions are often
deemed permissible, and those lacking emotional salience are
often judged immoral (Haidt et al., 1993; Greene, 2007; Koenigs
et al., 2007). Moreover, even when considering highly emotional
stimuli, greater deliberation (Pizarro et al., 2003a; Bartels, 2008)
or weaker sensitivity to one’s bodily states (Schnall et al., 2008)
considerably dulls the eﬀects of emotion on moral judgments.
Much additional research is needed—using a wider range of
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populations, stimulus items, and measures of emotion—before it
becomes clear how, and to what extent, emotional mechanisms
impact moral judgment (Huebner et al., 2009).
Importantly, any eﬀect of emotion on moral judgment can
arise only after causal and mental analysis (cf. Mikhail, 2007). If
moral emotions stem from “negative feelings about the actions
or character of others” (Haidt, 2003, p. 856, emphasis added),
then they are predicated upon preceding causal-mental analysis.
But negative aﬀect may arise prior to such analysis, setting the
process of moral judgment in motion. Negative events elicit
rapid aﬀective or evaluative responses (Ito et al., 1998; Van
Berkum et al., 2009) and trigger processes of explanation and
sense-making (Malle and Knobe, 1997b; Wong and Weiner,
1981). Thus, negative aﬀect may lead perceivers to analyze
agents’ causal and mental contribution, which thereby can elicit
speciﬁc emotions such as anger (Russell andGiner-Sorolla, 2011a;
Laurent et al., 2015c). In this way, negative aﬀect motivates
causal-mental analysis, rather than a search for blame-consistent
information speciﬁcally. Knowing simply that a negative event
has occurred is not enough for moral judgment (or moral
emotion); people need to know how it occurred. And to make
this determination, they appeal to the causal-mental structure of
the event.
This conceptualization, whereby people interpret their
negative aﬀect within an explanatory framework prior to
experiencing emotion, is consistent with cognitive appraisal
theories of emotion (Barrett, 2006a; Barrett et al., 2007). On
these accounts, “core aﬀect” arises from the constant valuation
of environmental stimuli (e.g., concerning harmfulness or
helpfulness) and leads to emotion via the application of a
conceptual framework that categorizes and explains the aﬀect
(Barrett, 2006a). In the context of moral judgment, causal-mental
analysis provides the conceptual framework, appraising negative
aﬀect and thus giving rise to emotional experience and moral
judgment.8
Judgment Timing and Information
Search
One domain in which the predictions from various models
are decisively testable is that of timing. Many models assume,
at least implicitly, that people make certain judgments before
others. Both Cushman (2008) and Malle et al. (2014) posit that
causality and mental state judgments precede blame. Knobe’s
(2010) model predicts that initial moral judgments (e.g., about
goodness or badness) precede mental state judgments, though
the latter may precede full-ﬂedged blame. Alicke’s (2000) model
suggests that blame (in the form of spontaneous evaluations)
should occur prior to judgments about causality and mental
states. Testing these predictions about timing can further clarify
the way in which moral judgments unfold and can adjudicate
between claims made by existing models.
The claims of several models also have implications for
perceivers’ search for information. Some models imply that,
when assessing negative events, perceivers will try to actively
8Negative aﬀect itself also requires appraisal—at minimum, that the event in
question is negative.
acquire information about an agent’s causal involvement and
mental states, as these most strongly guide blame (Cushman,
2008; Malle et al., 2014). Recent evidence supports such patterns
of information seeking behavior (Guglielmo and Malle, under
review). Alicke’s model, in contrast, might predict that suﬃciently
negative events will elicit blame and perceivers will rarely seek
additional information about mental states (unless they have to
justify their blame judgments). Processing models imply that
when people are emotionally engaged, they may fail to notice or
search for consequentialist information (e.g., how many people
will be saved as a result of pushing the man oﬀ the footbridge).
Domains, Contexts, and Measurement of
Moral Judgment
In addition to attending to the integration of information
and processing models, the study of morality will likewise
beneﬁt from further diversity and integration. Scholars have
long focused on moral domains of harm and fairness, but
Haidt (2007, 2008) and Graham et al. (2009, 2011) have
emphasized the psychological relevance of various additional
domains. Comparisons between moral domains are becoming
more prevalent (Horberg et al., 2009; Young and Saxe, 2011;
Chakroﬀ and Young, 2015) andmay soon yield conclusions about
the extent to which existing models are widely, or narrowly,
supported across domains.
Although moral judgments are typically studied
intrapersonally—as cognitive judgments in the mind of a social
perceiver—they undoubtedly serve important interpersonal
functions (Haidt, 2001; McCullough et al., 2013; Malle et al.,
2014). Moral judgments respond to the presence of social
audiences (Kurzban et al., 2007), elicit social distancing from
dissimilar others (Skitka et al., 2005), and trigger attempts to
modify others’ future behavior (Cushman et al., 2009). Given
that moral cognition ultimately serves a social regulatory
function of guiding and coordinating social behavior (Cushman,
2013; Malle et al., 2014), further forging the connections
between intrapersonal moral judgments and their interpersonal
manifestations will be a critical direction for future research.
The measurement of moral judgment will also require detailed
comparison and integration. Existing models primarily examine
a single type of judgment—such as responsibility, wrongness,
permissibility, or blame—and although all such judgments of
course rely on information processing, they nonetheless diﬀer in
important ways (Cushman, 2008; O’Hara et al., 2010; Malle et al.,
2014). Wrongness and permissibility judgments typically take
intentional actions as their object of judgment (Cushman, 2008).
Thus, judging that it is wrong (or impermissible) to X implies that
it is wrong to intentionally X; it usually makes little sense to say
that unintentionally X-ing is wrong. In contrast, responsibility
and blame take both intentional and unintentional actions as
their object of judgment. Thus, one can be judged responsible
(Schlenker et al., 1994) or blameworthy (Cushman, 2008; Young
and Saxe, 2009) even for purely unintentional negative behavior.
Furthermore, because blame takes into account an agent’s reasons
for acting, those who commit negative actions for justiﬁed
reasons—such as self defense (Piazza et al., 2013)—can be
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deemed fully responsible yet minimally blameworthy (McGraw,
1987). Since these various moral judgments diﬀer with respect to
the amount and type of information they integrate, future work
can further diﬀerentiate them by assessing both the temporal
sequence of these judgments, and their sensitivity to diﬀerent
information features.
Finally, in reﬂecting the overwhelming preponderance of
existing research, this review has focused on negative moral
judgments. But what is the information processing structure of
positive moral judgments? Relatively few studies have directly
compared negative and positive moral judgments, although those
that have done so reveal that these judgments are not mere
opposites. Consistent with general negativity dominance eﬀects
(Baumeister et al., 2001; Rozin and Royzman, 2001), positive
moral judgments are less severe than negative ones (Cushman
et al., 2009; Goodwin and Darley, 2012), and certain categories of
events—including outcomes that are unintended yet foreseen—
elicit substantial blame when negative but essentially no praise
when positive (Knobe, 2003a; Guglielmo and Malle, 2010). Since
perceivers expect, by default, that others will try to foster positive
outcomes and prevent negative ones (Pizarro et al., 2003b;
Knobe, 2010), earning praise is more diﬃcult than earning blame.
Moreover, people often perceive that positive behavior is driven
by ulterior motives (Tsang, 2006), which can quickly erode initial
positive impressions (Marchand and Vonk, 2005). Thus, whereas
positive and negative moral judgments share some information
processing features—including sensitivity to intentionality and
motives—the former are weaker and less broadly applicable.
Beyond Bias
Claims of people’s deviation from normative or rational models
of behavior abound in the psychological literature. As Krueger
and Funder (2004) have shown, bias is often implied both by
pattern X and by pattern not X, leaving it near impossible to
discover unbiased behavior. As one example, viewing oneself
more favorably than others constitutes a bias (self-enhancement),
as does viewing oneself less favorably (self-eﬀacement).
The emphasis on bias, and its supposed ubiquity, similarly
exists in the moral judgment literature. Haidt (2001, p. 822)
notes that “moral reasoning is not left free to search for truth
but is likely to be hired out like a lawyer by various motives,”
and many theorists appear to agree with this portrayal of biased
judgment. The problem, however, is that opposing patterns of
judgment are taken as evidence of such bias. The designation
“outcome bias” implies that relying on outcome information
connotes bias. To avoid biased judgment, perceivers should
ignore outcomes and focus on the contents of the agent’s mind.
In contrast, consequentialist accounts hold that “consequences
are the only things that ultimately matter” (Greene, 2007, p. 37),
which implies that perceivers should substantially—or even
exclusively—rely on outcome information.
We have therefore doomed perceivers to be inescapably
biased. Whatever judgments they make (e.g., whether using
outcome information fully, partially, or not at all), they will
violate certain normative standards of moral judgment. It is time,
then, to move beyond charges of bias (cf. Bennis et al., 2010;
Elqayam and Evans, 2011; Krueger and Funder, 2004). Future
research will be more fruitful by focusing not on normative
questions of how “good” or “correct” moral judgments are but on
descriptive and functional questions: How do moral judgments
work? And why do they work this way?
CONCLUSION
This paper advanced an information-processing framework of
morality, asserting that moral judgment is best understood by
jointly examining the information elements and psychological
processes that shape moral judgments. Dominant models were
organized in this framework and evaluated on empirical and
theoretical grounds. The paper highlighted distinct processes
of norm-violation detection and causal-mental analysis, and
discussed a recent model—the Path Model of Blame (Malle et al.,
2014)—that examines these in an explicit information processing
approach. Various suggestions for future research were discussed,
including clarifying the roles of aﬀect and emotion, diversifying
the stimuli and methodologies used to assess moral judgment,
distinguishing between various types of moral judgments, and
emphasizing the functional (not normative) basis of morality.
By remaining cognizant of the complex and systematic nature
of moral judgment, exciting research on this topic will no doubt
continue to ﬂourish.
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